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ABSTRACT: Chisholm v. Georgia was the first great constitutional case decided by 
the Supreme Court.  In Chisholm, the Court addressed the fundamental question: 
Who is Sovereign?  The People or the State?  It adopted an individual concept of 
popular sovereignty rather than the modern view that limits popular sovereignty 
to collective or democratic self-government.  It denied that the State of Georgia 
was a sovereign entitled, like the King of England, to assert immunity from a 
lawsuit brought by a private citizen.  Despite all this, Chisholm is not among the 
canon of cases that all law students are taught.  Why not?  In this essay, I offer 
several reasons: Constitutional law is taught by doctrine rather than 
chronologically; law professors have reason to privilege the Marshall Court; and 
the Court’s individualist view of popular sovereignty is thought to have been 
repudiated by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  I explain why the 
Eleventh Amendment did not repudiate the view of sovereignty expressed in 
Chisholm by comparing the wording of the Eleventh with that of the Ninth 
Amendment, and conclude by suggesting another reason why Chisholm is not in 
the canon: Law professors follow the lead of the Supreme Court and, like the 
Ninth Amendment, the Supreme Court has deemed its first great decision too 
radical in its implications. 
Constitutional law professors know two things that their students often do 
not: John Marshall was not the first Chief Justice of the United States, and 
Marbury v. Madison1 was not the first great constitutional case decided by the 
Supreme Court.  That honor goes to Chisholm v. Georgia,2 decided some ten 
years earlier when John Jay was Chief Justice.  Students may be unaware of these 
facts because most basic courses in constitutional law begin with Marbury, which, 
along with Marshall’s opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland,3 and Gibbons v. 
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Ogden,4 are the earliest cases that are emphasized.  The opinions in Chisholm are 
never read; at most, the case is mentioned in passing to explain the origin of the 
Eleventh Amendment that reversed its holding.  
 In Chisholm, the Supreme Court on a vote of four to one rejected the 
assertion by Georgia of sovereign immunity as a defense against a suit in federal 
court for breach of contract brought against it by a citizen of another state.  The 
fundamentality of the issue presented by the case was aptly characterized by 
Justice Wilson:   
 
This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is a State; 
certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined 
is, whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States? This 
question, important in itself, will depend on others, more important still; and, 
may, perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical than this “do the 
people of the United States form a Nation?”5
In Chisholm, the Justices of the Supreme Court rejected Geogia’s claim to 
be sovereign.  They concluded instead that, to the extent the term “sovereignty” is 
even appropriately applied to the newly-adopted Constitution, it rests with the 
people, rather than with state governments.  Their decision is inconsistent with the 
modern concept of popular sovereignty that views democratically-elected 
legislatures as exercising the sovereign will of the people, or the modern claim 
that states are entitled to  the same immunity as was enjoyed by the King of 
England.  The Justices in Chisholm affirmed that, in America, the states are not 
kings, and their legislatures are not the supreme successors to the Crown. 
 
I. WHY WE SHOULD TEACH CHISHOLM 
The judicial opinions in Chisholm are interesting for several reasons.  To 
begin with, the opinions exemplify the early reliance by the courts on first 
principles, or what Wilson referred to as “general principles of right”6 and only 
secondarily on text.  Chisholm is typical in this regard.  This is not to claim that 
courts ever countenanced using first principles to ignore or contradict a pertinent 
text.  Rather, Chisholm well illustrates how first principles were used to interpret 
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the meaning of the text in Article III, section 2 that reads: “The judicial power of 
the United States shall extend to . . . controversies, between a state and citizens of 
another State,” against the assertion that this text must be qualified by an extra-
textual unwritten “first principle” known as sovereign immunity.  Georgia’s extra-
textual claim of sovereign immunity placed the issue squarely before the Court. 
 Justice Wilson began his analysis of this claim by contesting the 
appropriateness of the very term “sovereignty” with regard to the new 
Constitution: 
 
To the Constitution of the United States the term Sovereign, is totally unknown. 
There is but one place where it could have been used with propriety. But, even 
in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those, 
who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have announced 
themselves “Sovereign” people of the United States: But serenely conscious of 
the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.7
Wilson then identified possible alternative meanings of the term 
“sovereign.”  First, “the term sovereign has for its correlative, subject[.] In this 
sense, the term can receive no application; for it has no object in the Constitution 
of the United States. Under that Constitution there are citizens, but no subjects.”8
Indeed, Wilson noted that the “term, subject, occurs, indeed, once in the 
instrument; but to mark the contrast strongly, the epithet “foreign” is prefixed.”9
Wilson rejected this concept as inapplicable to states because he knew “the 
Government of that State to be republican; and my short definition of such a 
Government is, one constructed on this principle, that the Supreme Power resides 
in the body of the people.”10 Furthermore, 
 
the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a 
part of the “People of the United States,” did not surrender the Supreme or 
Sovereign Power to that State; but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it to 
themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a 
sovereign State.11 
7Id. at 454. 
8Id. at 456. 
9Id. at 456-57 (citing Art. III. § 3). 
10Id. at 457. 
11Id.
In other words, according to Wilson, to the extent one wishes to use the word 
“sovereignty” at all, sovereignty lies in the people themselves, not in any 
government formed by the people. 
 Wilson then considered another sense of sovereignty that relates it to the 
feudal power of English kings.  “Into England this system was introduced by the 
conqueror: and to this era we may, probably, refer the English maxim, that the 
King or sovereign is the fountain of Justice. . . .   With regard to him, there was no 
superior power; and, consequently, on feudal principles, no right of 
jurisdiction.”12 Wilson characterized this as “only a branch of a much more 
extensive principle, on which a plan of systematic despotism has been lately 
formed in England, and prosecuted with unwearied assiduity and care.”13 And he 
expressly condemned William Blackstone for advancing and defending this 
despotic system. 
 Wilson rejected this feudal notion of sovereignty on the ground “that 
another principle, very different in its nature and operations, forms,” in his 
judgment, “the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the 
pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, 
whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be 
found in the man.”14 In other words, obedience must rest on the consent of the 
only “sovereign” from which justice and equality rest: the individual person who 
is asked to obey the law.  “The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by 
human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, upon which he 
becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which 
are formed and authorised by those laws.”15 
State governments are simply the product of these very same people, 
themselves bound by laws, who have banded together to form a government.  As 
such, states are as bound by the law as are the ultimate sovereign individuals that 
establish them.  “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may 
not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise? 
If the dignity of each singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly must be 
unimpaired.”16 
From this Wilson reached the following conclusion about the state of 
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Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity against a suit for breach of contract:  
 
A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like a dishonest 
merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of 
Justice: Upon general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to 
answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a 
new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a Sovereign 
State? Surely not.17 
That this opinion was authored by Justice Wilson is significant.  James 
Wilson was as crucial a member of the Constitutional Convention as any other, 
including James Madison.  His defense of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania 
ratification convention was lengthy and instrumental, and that state’s ratification 
set the stage for the Constitution’s eventual adoption in other keys states. Wilson 
was also among the most theoretically sophisticated of the founders, as evidence 
by his lectures on law given as a professor from 1790 to 1792 at the College of 
Pennsylvania.18 Indeed, one reason why his opinion in Chisholm may be 
overlooked is that it may seem just too long and theoretical to be a good judicial 
opinion. 
 Wilson was not alone in locating sovereignty in the individual person.  
Chief Justice Jay, in his opinion, referred tellingly to “the joint and equal 
sovereigns of this country.”19 Jay affirmed the “great and glorious principle, that 
the people are the sovereign of this country, and consequently that fellow citizens 
and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other in their 
own Courts to have their controversies determined.”20 Denying individuals a right 
to sue a state, while allowing them to sue municipalities, “ would not correspond 
with the equal rights we claim; with the equality we profess to admire and 
maintain, and with that popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes.”21 
Neither Wilson nor Jay’s individualistic view of sovereignty fits comfortably into 
the notion of popular sovereignty as a “collective” concept.22 
17Id.
18See MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON 1742-1798 
27-29 (1997) (describing importance of Wilson’s lectures on law). 
19Id. at 477. 
20Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
21Id. at 473 (emphasis added). 
22Elizabeth Price Foley captures this concept by calling it “residual individual sovereignty.”  See 
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Even Justice Iredell, the sole dissenter in Chisholm, did not rest his dissent 
on a rejection of the joint and individual sovereignty of the people.  Instead, he 
devoted the bulk of his opinion to whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
hear a breach of contract case in the absence of expressed authorization either by 
the Constitution itself or by Congress.  Finding neither, he would have dismissed 
the suit.  The thrust of Iredell’s opinion, therefore, attempts to avoid reaching the 
issue of sovereignty, which he addresses only in passing in what would have been 
obiter dictum had his reasoning prevailed.23 
Wilson and Jay’s individualistic concept of sovereignty was later 
passionately expanded upon by John Taylor in response to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in McCulloch:
I do not know how it has happened, that this word has crept into our political 
dialect, unless it be that mankind prefer mystery to knowledge; and that 
governments love obscurity better than specification. The unknown powers of 
sovereignty and supremacy may be relished, because they tickle the mind with 
hopes and fears; just as we indulge the taste with Cayenne pepper, though it 
disorders the health, and finally destroys the body. Governments delight in a 
power to administer the palatable drugs of exclusive privileges and pecuniary 
gifts; and selfishness is willing enough to receive them; and this mutual pleasure 
may possibly have suggested the ingenious stratagem, for neutralizing 
constitutional restrictions by a single word. . . .24 
OF PUBLIC MORALITY 42 (2006) (“one of the foundational principles of American law — at both 
the state and federal level — is residual individual sovereignty”).  William Castro has coined the 
phrase “the people’s sovereignty” to capture this idea.  See William R. Castro, James Iredell and 
the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1995)(“the idea of the 
people’s sovereignty should not be confused with popular sovereignty, which carries connotations 
of democracy and universal suffrage.”).  But it may well be anachronistic to concede the term 
“popular sovereignty” actually used by Justice Jay to the modern collective reading. 
23Here is what he says on the nature of sovereignty: 
Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been 
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United States are in respect to the powers surrendered. The United States are 
sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State in 
the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, 
because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the States 
have surrendered to them: Of course the part not surrendered must remain as it 
did before. . . .  
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In his lengthy treatment of the subject Taylor notes, 
 
Sovereignty implies superiority and subordination. It was therefore inapplicable 
to a case of equality, and more so to the subordinate-power in reference to its 
creator. The word being rejected by our constitutions, cannot be correctly 
adopted for their construction. . . . It would produce several very obvious 
contradictions in our political principles. It would transfer sovereignty from the 
people, (confining it to mean the right of self-government only,) to their own 
servants. It would invest governments and departments, invested with limited 
powers only, with unspecified powers. It would create many sovereignties, each 
having a right to determine the extent of its sovereignty by its own will. . . . Our 
constitutions, therefore, wisely rejected this indefinite word as a traitor of civil 
rights, and endeavored to kill it dead by specifications and restrictions of power, 
that it might never again be used in political disquisitions.25 
While Iredell would have afforded to states the sovereignty of kings, 
Taylor identifies from where kings appropriated the term.  “In fact,” he observed,  
 
the term “sovereignty,” was sacrilegiously stolen from the attributes of God, and 
impiously assumed by kings. Though they committed the theft, aristocracies and 
republicks have claimed the spoil. . . .  By our constitutions, we rejected the 
errors upon which our forefathers had been wrecked, and withheld from our 
governments the keys of temporal and eternal rights, by usurping which, their 
patriots had been converted into tyrants; and invested them only with powers to 
restrain internal wrongs, and to resist foreign hostility; without designing to 
establish a sovereign power of robbing one citizen to enrich another.26 
By omitting Chisholm from the canon, students learn none of this; they are left 
unexposed to the radical and fundamental idea that, if anyone is sovereign, it is 
“We the People” as individuals, in contrast with the modern view that locates 
popular sovereignty in Congress or state legislatures, which supposedly represent 
the will of the people.   
 Another reason for teaching Chisholm is that it represents the “road not 
taken” with respect to constitutional amendments.  The states and Congress chose 
to follow the advice of Justice Blair. “If the Constitution is found inconvenient in 
practice in this or any other particular,” he wrote in his opinion, “it is well that a 
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regular mode is pointed out for amendment.”27 Precisely because its holding was 
reversed two years later by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, Chisholm 
represents an opportunity to consider how the practice of constitutional 
interpretation by courts might have been  different if the tradition of correcting 
Supreme Court decisions by express amendment had taken hold.  
 As I shall discuss below, there are two possible implications of Chisholm’s 
effective “reversal” by the Eleventh Amendment, which reads: “The judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of 
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”28 The enactment of 
the Eleventh Amendment could mean that the Court had incorrectly interpreted 
the Constitution, and the Amendment restores its original meaning.  This is the 
assumption of modern so-called Eleventh Amendment cases.  But the enactment 
of the Eleventh Amendment could mean instead that the Supreme Court was 
correct in its interpretation of Article III, but the states were unhappy enough with 
this implication of the original meaning of the Constitution to successfully have it 
amended through the political process.   
 In either case, if written amendments were seen as a more normal reaction 
to a Supreme Court decision, the perceived need for creative “interpretation” by 
the Supreme Court itself may have been obviated.  The rapid adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment suggests that Article V constitutional amendment can be 
practical, provided the legal and political culture views amendments as a natural 
response either to a Supreme Court misinterpretation of the Constitution or to a 
correct interpretation of our imperfect Constitution with which there is 
widespread dissatisfaction. 
 
II. WHY WE NEGLECT CHISHOLM 
Before addressing which view of the Eleventh Amendment’s relation to 
Chisholm is correct, it is worth pausing for a moment to ask why Chisholm and 
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment is usually omitted from the canon—the 
set of cases that are almost always covered in the basic course on constitutional 
law.  I can think of at least three reasons.  First, constitutional law is ordinarily 
taught doctrine-by-doctrine, rather than chronologically.  If one organizes the 
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course by modern doctrines, there is no obvious or natural place in which to 
include Chisholm because “sovereignty” is not among the doctrines normally 
taught in either the structures or the rights portions of constitutional law.
By the same token, when teaching modern doctrines, there is no natural 
place in which to cover the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,29 which concerns the 
meaning of the Fugitive Slave Clause.  Even the pivotal case of Dred Scott v. 
Sanford,30 does not fit neatly into introductory courses devoted mainly to 
structural issues. Were constitutional law taught chronologically, it would be an 
open invitation to take up the question that occupied the Supreme Court in its first 
major decision: the nature of sovereignty in the United States.  And it would be 
equally natural to follow the coverage of the Marshall Court’s famous decisions 
with the infamous slavery decisions of the Taney Court. 
 Such an opening sequence conveys to students an entirely different 
impression of the subject of constitutional law than does our current organization 
that revolves around modern doctrine and typically begins with Marbury. And it 
would also make far more meaningful to students both Chief Justice Marshall’s 
views on the nature of sovereignty in McCulloch31 and Chief Justice Taney’s 
views of sovereignty expressed in Dred Scott.32 In other words, Chisholm is just 
the first of several landmark Supreme Court treatments of the nature of 
sovereignty, but dropping it from the canon distorts the teaching of this subject by 
reading the Marshall Court opinions out of context.33 
2941 U.S. (Pet.) 539 (1842). 
3060 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
31See McCulloch, 17 U.S., at 404-05 (“The government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically, 
and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers 
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”). 
32See Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 404(“The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are 
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, 
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and 
conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 
‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this 
sovereignty.”) 
33To this sequence I also add the discussion of sovereignty articulated in James Madison’s  Report 
to the Virginia House of Delegates.  See James Madison, Report on the Alien, in WRITINGS 608, 
___ (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999): 
The Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the states, 
given by each in its sovereign capacity. . . . The states, then, being the parties to 
the constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of 
necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority, to decide in the last 
The second reason we lead with Marbury rather than with Chisholm is 
that, until relatively recently, constitutional law professors in the post-Warren 
Court era viewed judicial review as an engine of social justice.  Although 
enthusiasm for judicial review has waned in recent years — as witnessed by the 
recent interest in “judicial minimalism,”34 “taking the constitution away from the 
courts,”35 and “popular constitutionalism”36 — this recent intellectual trend has 
yet to affect the organization of the basic courses in constitutional law.  So 
judicial review still kicks off most casebooks that were devised years before 
interest developed in “the constitution outside the courts.”37 
A third reason for omitting Chisholm is that, according to “modern” 
Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1880 case of Hans v. Louisiana,38 
Chisholm’s view of sovereignty was repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment and, 
therefore, the decision itself is a dead letter.  Even when the Eleventh Amendment 
is included in the basic constitutional law course, it is covered  well after Marbury 
and Chisholm is usually relegated to a passing footnote in the coverage of the 
modern so-called “Eleventh Amendment” cases.  
 This last reason for ignoring Chisholm will be the subject of the balance of 
my remarks. I will contest the modern Court’s claim that the view of sovereignty 
it adopted in Chisholm was repudiated by the Eleventh Amendment.  Although I 
am hardly the first person to question this claim,39 I will explain why a 
comparison of the wording of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments undercuts the 
Supreme Court’s view that the individualist concept of sovereignty that the Court 
in Chisholm relied upon to reach its result was repudiated by the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Consequently, I join other scholars who have concluded that the 
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37See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION ( 2006). 
38Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
39See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: 
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than 
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); 
James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998).  
modern Supreme Court’s so-called “Eleventh Amendment” line of cases is based 
on a faulty reading of the Eleventh Amendment dating back to Hans and is 
fundamentally misconceived.  
 
III. WHY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DID NOT REPUDIATE CHISHOLM’S
APPROACH TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
To assess the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and 
Chisholm, it is useful to identify clearly the two alternative readings of the 
Amendment.  First, the Amendment could be read narrowly as simply reversing 
the holding of Chisholm that states may be sued by citizens of other states in 
federal court.  Of course, the Amendment does more than this by also immunizing 
states from suits by subjects of foreign nations.  That it did so may be significant, 
as we shall see.  According to this reading, the Eleventh Amendment leaves 
entirely intact the underlying individualist concept of popular sovereignty upon 
which the Court rested its holding. 
 The second reading of the Amendment was the one adopted by the 
Reconstruction Court in Hans and continues to be accepted by the Court.  In 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,40 Chief Justice Rehnquist provided a 
concise summary of this position: 
 
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood the Eleventh 
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . 
which it confirms.”  That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in  
Hans v. Louisiana (1890), has two parts:  first, that each State is a sovereign 
entity in our federal system;  and second, that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of 
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.”41 
Chief Justice Rehnquist excoriates the dissent for “relying  upon the now-
discredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.”42 Rehnquist affirms the Court’s 
conclusion in  Hans that the views of state sovereignty articulated by Justice 
Iredell in his dissent “were clearly right – as the people of the United States in 
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their sovereign capacity subsequently decided”43 when it enacted the Eleventh 
Amendment 
 The modern Eleventh Amendment doctrine, therefore, rests not on the 
literal text of the Amendment, but rather on what the Court claims to be its 
underlying principle, or what Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to as its 
“presupposition.”  Chief Justice Rehnquist is quite forthright about this:   
 
The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed 
at a straw man — we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment is [quoting Hans] “to strain the Constitution and the 
law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.”  The text dealt in terms 
only with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm. . . .44 
As I have already noted, however, this last sentence is not quite true.  The 
text of the Eleventh Amendment goes beyond the narrow problem of a state being 
sued by a citizen of another state in federal court, and extends as well to suits by 
“citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”  John Manning finds this to be 
significant. 
 
Indeed, so discriminating is the text that it parses a subcategory from amidst the 
final head of jurisdiction (“Controversies . . . between a State . . . and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects”), leaving untouched suits between a state and 
“foreign States” while restricting suits against states by “foreign . . . Citizens or 
Subjects.”  As a first cut, this fact suggests at least that the Amendment’s 
framers carefully picked and chose among Article III, Section 2, Clause 1’s 
categories to determining what jurisdictional immunity to prescribe.45 
From this Manning concludes: “The Eleventh Amendment’s careful inclusion and 
omission of particular heads of Article III jurisdiction creates at least a prima 
facie case that the amendment process entailed judgments about the precise 
contexts in which it was desirable (or perhaps politically feasible) to provide for 
state sovereign immunity.”46 
It is striking that the Court in Hans, and up through today, employed a 
version of originalism that has, in recent years, been repudiated by most 
 
43Hans, 134 U.S. at 14. 
44Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69. 
45John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 
YALE L.J. 1663, 1739 (2004). 
46Id. 
originalists: that based on the original intentions of either the framers or ratifiers, 
rather than upon the original public meaning of the text they adopted.  By 
appealing to the principles or “presuppositions” allegedly held by the drafters of 
the text in question to override the public meaning of the text itself, the 
Reconstruction Court in Hans, perhaps not entirely coincidentally,47 employed the 
same version of original intent originalism used by Justice Taney in Dred Scott,
when interpreting the meaning of “the People” in the Preamble as well as the 
meaning of the Declaration of Independence.   
 Justice Bradley’s opinion in Hans exemplifies a typical feature of original 
intent originalism: its reliance on the counterfactual hypothetical intentions of the 
framers.   
 
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was 
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own State in the 
federal courts, while the idea of suits by citizens of other States, or of foreign 
States, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the 
Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein 
contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own citizens in cases 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that 
it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is 
almost an absurdity on its face.48 
How similar this sounds to Justice Taney in Dred Scott.49 
In his article, Manning defends the narrow interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment by making an important methodological claim about originalist-
textualism: Specific constitutional text should be interpreted specifically 
according to its terms, and not expanded, contracted, or contradicted by the 
purposes (or original intention) for which the text was adopted, or by its 
 
47The use of original intent to narrow the meaning of the text of the Reconstruction Amendments 
was a favorite technique of the Reconstruction Court, beginning as early as The Slaughter-House 
Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873). 
48Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. 
49See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at ___: 
It cannot be supposed that [the State sovereignties] intended to secure to [free 
blacks] rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout the 
Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion. 
More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States 
regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a 
Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character from 
another State.  
underlying principles. “Given the heightened consensus requirements imposed by 
Article V,” he writes,   
 
when an amendment speaks with exceptional specificity, interpreters must be 
sensitive to the possibility that the drafters were willing to go or realistically 
could go only so far and no farther with their policy.  When such compromise is 
evident, respect for the minority veto indicates that those implementing the 
amendment should hew closely to the lines actually drawn, lest they disturb 
some unrecorded concession insisted upon by the minority or offered 
preemptively by the majority as part of the price of assent.50 
In short, “when the amendment process addresses a specific question and resolves 
it in a precise way, greater cause exists for interpreters to worry about invoking 
general sources of constitutional authority to submerge the carefully drawn lines 
of a more specific compromise.”51 
Manning offers three reasons to conclude that the original public meaning 
of the Eleventh Amendment was limited to its precise terms.  First, “to evaluate 
the Amendment’s limited enumeration of exceptions, it is helpful to know the 
legal baseline against which the adopters acted.”52 And the most salient 
background assumption was the Court’s decision in Chisholm in which four of 
five Justices denied the existence, as a general matter, of state sovereign 
immunity, and Justices Wilson and Jay specifically “asserted that state sovereign 
immunity was flatly incompatible with the premises of our republican form of 
government.”53 
The Court’s decision in Chisholm, therefore, put before Congress, the 
states, and the people of the nation as a whole, a proposition concerning the nature 
of sovereignty that, while it may have been implicit in the text of Article III, 
might not have been widely apparent.  According to the Court, states may be sued 
by individuals in federal court to enforce their private contractual rights; their 
assertion of immunity from suit based on their sovereignty is inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of Republicanism on which the Constitution rests.   
 With this issue now unequivocally presented by the decision in Chisholm,
where it had not been before, did Congress respond with an amendment squarely 
rejecting the Court’s view of popular sovereignty as resting in the People as 
 
50Manning, supra note 45, at 1735-36. 
51Id. at 1736. 
52Id. at 1743. 
53Id. at 1744. 
individuals rather than in the states?  It did not.  Instead, it responded with a very 
narrow, precisely worded, withdrawal of judicial power (or subject matter 
jurisdiction) in two specific circumstances.  
 Would the Eleventh Amendment have been ratified so swiftly, or at all, if 
it had been more broadly worded?  Manning contends that we can never know the 
answer to this question.  The wording of the Amendment could well have been a 
product of compromise within the drafting process, or have been drafted in 
anticipation of potential, but not yet realized, opposition to a broader claim of 
state sovereignty.   To interpret the amendment more broadly than the language 
that was actually proposed and ratified is to run a serious risk of overriding the 
desires of either a majority or a potential ratification-blocking minority who 
would never have consented to a broader claim of state power.  Furthermore, it 
may well have been the case that nationalistic Federalists in Congress gave the 
states the least they could get away with to mollify them. Again, because we will 
never know for certain, we should adhere to the public meaning of the text 
actually adopted rather than overriding that text by appealing to some underlying 
purpose or principle. 
 Manning’s conclusion here is worth quoting at length: 
 
Neither Article III nor any other provision of the original Constitution dealt 
directly with the problem of sovereign immunity, and American society had no 
previous occasion to confront the question squarely, one way or the other.  
When dissatisfaction with Chisholm brought the Article V process to bear on 
that previously unanswered question, the text that emerged quite clearly went so 
far and no farther in embracing state sovereign immunity.  Perhaps the resultant 
line-drawing merely reflected an inability to secure the requisite supermajorities 
for a broader Amendment.  But if so, that would be fully consistent with the play 
of Article V.  Especially in the context of an amendment process designed to 
protect political minorities, one cannot disregard the selective inclusion and 
exclusion implicit in such careful specification.  If American society for the first 
time was explicitly confronting the appropriate limitations on potential Article 
III jurisdiction over suits against states, one should perhaps attach significance 
not only to what the drafters placed in the Amendment, but also to what they 
deemed necessary or even prudent to exclude.  To do otherwise would risk 
upsetting whatever precise compromise may have emerged from the carefully 
drawn lawmaking process prescribed by Article V.54 
I find Manning’s argument against appealing to underlying purposes to 
 
54Id. at 1748-49. 
expand the specific wording of the Eleventh Amendment to be entirely 
convincing.  But he fails to consider another possible defense of the Court’s so-
called Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.  Constitutional texts not only have a 
literal grammatical meaning in themselves; they also have what Larry Solum has 
called “constitutional implicature.”55 These implications can be express 
references in the text to concepts, or can be implied affirmances of underlying 
assumptions that went unmentioned in the text.  Shifting the assumptions 
underlying the text as written would be to distort, rather than faithfully adhere to, 
the public meaning of the text. 
 An implication of the text is not the same as its purpose.  A piece of text 
can have many purposes, and these purposes are largely extra-textual.  A 
particular provision of a text is very likely to be either under- or over-inclusive of 
its underlying purposes, or both.  Moreover, while there was a demonstrable 
consensus concerning the adoption of a particular wording of a text, there may 
have been no comparable consensus about underlying purposes.  In contrast, an 
implication of the text is a product of its meaning, though it may not be expressed 
in so many words.  While saying one thing, it may imply something compatible 
with, though beyond, what it says.  And the original public meaning of the 
Constitution might be distorted if this implication is later denied or reversed, 
while the specific meaning of the text is preserved. 
 A good example of constitutional implicature can be found in the Ninth 
Amendment, which is also the only other provision of the Constitution to 
explicitly provide a rule for how the constitution “shall not be construed.”  The 
Ninth Amendment reads, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”56 Read 
literally,  the Ninth Amendment solely denies a single construction of the text: a 
construction that is based on “the enumeration in the constitution of certain 
rights.” It’s injunction  applies only when the enumeration of certain rights in the 
Constitution is offered as a reason for denying others retained by the people.  
According to this reading, the Ninth Amendment would have no implication 
whatsoever outside the assertion of this specific misconstruction based on the 
enumeration of rights.   
 
55See Lawrence Solum, Sentence Meaning and Clause Meaning, LEGAL THEORY BLOG,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/12/over_at_books_d.html (December 12, 2006); see 
generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 23-57 (1989) (discussing “conversational 
implicature”).  
56U.S. CONST. Amend. IX. 
Before questioning this claim, it is important to stress that even this 
limited reading of the Ninth Amendment as solely a “rule of construction” would 
render it extremely important.  For it would specifically negate a key claim of the 
most important footnote in Supreme Court history that begins: “There may be 
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”57 Footnote 
Four of Carolene Products is directly asserting that enumeration in the 
Constitution of certain “express prohibitions” is reason “to deny or disparage” any 
constitutional claims based on “other rights retained by the people.”  Even were 
the presumption of constitutionality affirmed in Carolene Products simply a 
burden shifting presumption, it would disparage the other rights retained by the 
people, while not perhaps denying them altogether.  But later, in cases such as 
Williamson v. Lee Optical,58 the “presumption” was rendered effectively 
irrebuttable, resulting in the effective denial of unenumerated rights, until 
Griswold v. Connecticut59 came along.   
 Ironically, it is the New Deal Court’s philosophy of Footnote Four to 
which today’s judicial conservative want to return when they disparage the 
protection by the courts of any unenumerated rights, as for example did Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in Troxel v. Granville.60 “The Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny 
or disparage’ other rights,” he wrote, “is far removed from affirming any one of 
them, and even farther removed from authorizing judges to identify what they 
might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the 
people.”61 Notice Justice Scalia’s rather blithe identification of the legislature 
with the people themselves, an equation that was widely rejected at the Founding, 
and expressly denied by the Supreme Court in Chisholm. 
I want to claim, however, that the Ninth Amendment does more than 
expressly reject the construction of the Constitution provided by Footnote Four.  
The text of the Ninth implies the existence of other rights retained by the people.  
Why?  For one thing, it refers explicitly to these “other[]”62 rights.   While it does 
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not expressly call for the affirmative protection of these rights, the rule of 
construction it proposes would make absolutely no sense if there were no such 
other rights.  Why else would there be an entire amendment added to the 
Constitution barring a construction of enumerated rights that would deny or 
disparage these other rights?  Of course, we have overwhelming historical 
evidence independent of the text, that the founders believed that the people 
possessed individual natural rights.  But the Ninth Amendment adds a textual 
affirmation of this underlying assumption of the text that could otherwise be 
denied.  And the existence of the Ninth Amendment’s reference to other rights 
retains by the people is important support for a conclusion that any construction 
of the Constitution that results in the denial of these rights would violate the 
Constitution’s original public meaning.  
 Assuming I am right to claim that the rule of construction provided by the 
Ninth Amendment implies the protection of other rights that are not to be denied, 
what does this tell us about the Eleventh Amendment?  One way to reconstruct 
sympathetically the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the “presupposition” of state 
sovereignty is to claim that it is not relying on the underlying purpose of the 
Eleventh Amendment, as characterized by John Manning, but instead on an 
implication of its specific text.  Just as the Ninth Amendment presupposes the 
existence of unenumerated rights, the Eleventh Amendment presupposes the 
existence of state sovereignty.  This seems to be what the Justice Rehnquist was 
getting at when he dismissed a “blind reliance” on the text of the Amendment.  A 
“blind reliance” would be to limit the text to its terms while denying what it 
implies, whether a blind reliance on the text of the Ninth Amendment that limits it 
solely to a rule of construction or, with the Eleventh Amendment, to limit it solely 
to barring two types of plaintiffs from suing state governments in federal court.    
 However, a careful comparison of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments  
undermines rather than supports Rehnquist’s claim that the text of the Eleventh 
implies the rejection of the broad reasoning (as opposed to the narrow holding) of 
Chisholm v. Georgia. To begin with, and most obviously, unlike the Ninth 
Amendment’s explicit reference to “others retained by the people,” the Eleventh 
Amendment contains no explicit reference either to a principle of state 
sovereignty or to a doctrine of state sovereign immunity.  With the Ninth 
Amendment, its injunction against drawing a particular conclusion from “the 
enumeration in the constitution of certain rights,” contains within it an expressed 
reference to — and therefore an implied affirmation of — the “other” rights 
“retained by the people,” coupled with the additional implication that these rights 
not be “denied or disparaged.”  
 To reach a contrary conclusion would require acceptance of the 
proposition that there are no other rights retained by the people, or that those that 
do exist may be denied or disparaged at the will of the legislature, provided only 
that such a denial is not justified on the ground that some rights were enumerated.  
But why foreclose this, and only this, justification of denying unenumerated rights 
by means of a constitutional amendment?  Clearly, the denial of unenumerated 
rights was the general evil to be avoided, and the Amendment was included to 
guard against a particular source of this evil that was aggravated by the addition 
of “the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights.”  And the source of this 
evil is the foreseeable assertion of the doctrine of expressio unius: to express or 
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other. 
 Notwithstanding that the text of the Eleventh Amendment contains no 
comparable textual reference to state sovereignty or state sovereign immunity, 
would it nevertheless be fair to imply these concepts the text does affirm?  I think 
not.  To see why, let us imagine a hypothetical amendment dealing with 
unenumerated rights whose origin would parallel that of  the Eleventh.  Recall 
that, for two years after the ratification of the Constitution, there was no Bill of 
Rights, so there was no express prohibition on takings of private property for 
public use.  Suppose that, during this period, the federal government took land for 
the public use of building a post office without making justice compensation to 
the property owner.  When the owner brings suit for compensation, the 
government denies the existence of any such right to compensation.  
 Now suppose further that, notwithstanding the absence of an express 
Takings Clause, the Supreme Court holds that the property owner is nevertheless 
entitled to just compensation. The opinions of the Justices are clearly based, first 
and foremost, on an extensive analysis of the pre-existent natural rights retained 
by the people that no republican government can properly deny or disparage, 
including the rights to life, liberty, property, as well as a right to the pursuit of 
happiness.  One Justice in the majority — call him “Justice Chase” — contends 
that “There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which 
will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; 
as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for 
personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof of the government 
was established.”63 Textually, the Court grounds its holding on the Necessary and 
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Proper Clause, reasoning that a law authorizing a taking of private property for 
public use without just compensation was not a “proper” law.  A lone dissenter — 
call him “Justice Iredell” — protests this reliance on unenumerated rights.  In his 
words: “It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act 
against natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a 
government, any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it so.”64 
This is not entirely hypothetical.  It is what the Court eventually did when 
it first applied the requirement of just compensation for governmental takings 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
[A] statute declaring in terms, without more, that the full and exclusive title to a 
described piece of land belonging to one person should be and is hereby vested 
in another person, would, if effectual, deprive the former of his property without 
due process of law, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Such an 
enactment would not receive judicial sanction in any country having a written 
constitution distributing the powers of government among three co-ordinate 
departments, and committing to the judiciary, expressly or by implication, 
authority to enforce the provisions of such constitution. It would be treated, not 
as an exertion of legislative power, but as a sentence, — an act of spoliation. 
Due protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of  
republican institutions. . . .  But if . . . a legislative enactment, assuming 
arbitrarily to take the property of one individual and give it to another 
individual, would not be due process of law, as enjoined by the fourteenth 
amendment, it must be that the requirement of due process of law in that 
amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the state to public use, 
and without compensation, of the private property of the citizen. The legislature 
may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private 
property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made 
for compensation.65 
Now imagine that Congress, in direct response to this decision of the 
Court, seeks to “overrule” it by enacting a constitutional amendment.  Two 
versions are proposed.  The first reads: “The judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to encompass the power to grant just compensations as a 
remedy for takings of private property for public use.”  The second reads, “This 
Constitution shall not be construed to encompass a judicial power to enforce any 
right not expressly enumerated herein.” Congress then chooses to propose, and 
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the states to ratify, the first rather than the second of these amendments. 
 One hundred years later it is argued that the version actually adopted 
presupposes the general proposition that unenumerated rights are not judicially 
protected.  Given this sequence of events, would this be a permissible 
construction of the amendment actually ratified?  Would it be reasonable to claim 
that the substance of the second proposed version was implied by adopting the 
text of the first?  Or would it instead be more reasonable to conclude, first, that 
the scope of the amendment actually adopted was limited solely to takings; and 
second, that, by adopting the first version rather than the second, Congress 
impliedly refused to reverse the broader reasoning of the Court that put the issue 
of the right to compensation before the Congress?  In other words, unlike the 
broader version, the narrowly worded amendment left the broad reasoning of the 
Court intact. 
 Why Congress might have chosen the narrower amendment may be 
unknowable.  Perhaps it accepted the Court’s general reasoning about 
unenumerated constitutional rights, but rejected its implication for the particular 
right to compensation for public takings.  Perhaps it disliked the Court’s general 
reasoning but was fearful that the more general amendment would get hung up in 
the ratification process, and it took what it felt confident it could get.  Manning’s 
point is that we cannot know for sure everything that might have led Congress to 
choose the narrow formulation. 
 Would it change the analysis if only the narrow version of the Amendment 
had been proposed, so that the broader wording was not directly rejected in favor 
of the narrower reading?  While perhaps reducing our certainty a tiny bit, I think 
such a change in the hypothetical does not affect the ultimate conclusion.  For in 
the hypothetical story that produced the amendment, it was the notorious assertion 
by the Court of a general judicial power to protect unenumerated rights that 
engendered the controversy.  Knowing this, Congress nevertheless addressed just 
one application of this more general power.  The conclusion remains that 
Congress left this judicially-claimed power intact. 
 The narrowly-drafted words of the Eleventh Amendment were adopted by 
Congress in the face of the open denial of state sovereignty affirmed by the Court, 
and especially by the opinions of Wilson and Jay.  In so doing, Congress turned 
away from more broadly-worded amendments.  For example, Massachusetts 
congressman Theodore Sedgewick initially proposed an amendment reading: 
 
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial 
courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the 
United States, at the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, 
or a foreigner or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within 
or without the United States.66 
But even this sweeping grant of immunity speaks in the jurisdictional terms of 
Article III, and concerns the scope of the judicial power, rather than confronting 
directly the Supreme Court’s denial of the concept of state sovereignty itself.  The 
terms of the public debate over Chisholm focused primarily on the “suability” of 
states, not on their “sovereignty.”67 It is not clear whether Chief Justice 
Rehnquist believed that the Eleventh Amendment should be viewed as a 
repudication of the principle that the people and not the states are sovereign; it is, 
however, certain that he adduced no evidence that those who proposed and 
ratified the Eleventh Amendment did so in order to establish that the perogatives 
of state government equaled those of the English King. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE DANGEROUSNESS OF CHISHOLM 
Let me conclude by emphasizing what I am not claiming in this essay.  
Despite the time I have spent discussing the Eleventh Amendment, this is not a 
lecture about its original meaning.  A rich and challenging literature exists 
examining this issue.  Nor am I proposing that we start our teaching of 
constitutional law by examining the scope and meaning of the Eleventh 
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By treating the problem as one of state suability, I have consciously chosen to 
adopt the usage of the generation that framed and ratified the Eleventh 
Amendment, and to abandon the language of state sovereign immunity that 
modern courts and commentators frequently use to characterize the Eleventh 
Amendment.  This modern talk of sovereign immunity suggests that the 
Eleventh Amendment marked a complete Anti-Federalist victory in the battle 
over state suability; in truth, the two parties appear to have reached a 
compromise. In any event, once the Court begins to conceptualize the problem 
of state suability in terms of a free-standing principle of “sovereign immunity,” 
rather than as a technical problem in the parsing of the language of judicial 
power, it unleashes a dangerous and unwieldy restriction on the federal courts’ 
power to enforce federal-law restrictions against the states. By returning to the 
language of state suability, I hope to cabin the influence of this spurious 
principle of sovereign immunity. 
Amendment.  That would be far too complex for students just beginning their 
study of the Constitution to comprehend.   
 Rather, my only claim about the Eleventh Amendment is to identify a 
single meaning it did not have.  Contrary to what the Supreme Court now 
maintains, the Eleventh Amendment was not a repudiation of the individualist 
conception of popular sovereignty articulated by Wilson and Jay.  Indeed, I would 
submit that the narrow and technical language of the Eleventh Amendment could 
not have been understood either as a repudiation of the grand and magisterial idea 
that “We the People” are sovereign or as establishing the power of the English 
Monarchy as the model of state government authority .   
 Given all this, I am proposing that it would be far better to begin the study 
of constitutional law with the deep issues in Chisholm, as well as with the 
importance of constitutional amendments, than to begin our classes with 
Marshall’s defense of judicial review in Marbury as has become the custom. 
 Second, I am not claiming that Congress was affirming the broader 
reasoning of the case when it reversed only the narrow holding of Chisholm. John 
Manning seems to suggest otherwise,68 and he may well be right.  But, for the 
present, I am claiming  only that the broader principle of state sovereignty to 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist referred was not a “presupposition” of the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment.  So far as constitutional implicature is concerned, the 
Eleventh Amendment leaves the reasoning of Chisholm as it was.  As such it must 
be judged on its merits. 
 Nor am I claiming in this lecture that the Court in Chisholm was correct in 
its conception of popular sovereignty as belonging to the people as individuals 
and not to the state or state governments, either as a matter of constitutional 
theory or of history.  Of course, my sympathies on this subject should be obvious.  
That Chisholm was decided so close to the enactment of the Constitution — in 
contrast with John Marshall’s opinions or the Court’s decision in Hans — and that 
the individualist concept of popular sovereignty was affirmed by the eminences of 
James Wilson and John Jay is powerful evidence that “the People” to which the 
Constitution refers was indeed an individualistic concept.  At minimum, it cannot 
be considered anachronistic to attribute so individualist a sense of sovereignty to 
the era. 
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That “joint-sovereignty” resides in the individuals who comprise the 
people is also textually supported by the wording of the Tenth Amendment, which 
confirms that all powers not delegated to the general government by the 
Constitution are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.  If at least 
some of the “other” rights retained by the people to which the Ninth Amendment 
refers belong to individuals, as I believe the evidence shows to be the case,69 it 
would be exceedingly odd if “the People” to which the Tenth Amendment refers 
are not also individuals.  And “the People” is explicitly distinguished from “the 
states.”  I confess that I am beginning to suspect that the purely collective reading 
of “the People” by Akhil Amar and others may well be anachronistic, but to 
establish this proposition would require more investigation into the historical 
sources than I have yet to attempt. 
 My only claim with respect to the Eleventh Amendment is that it did not 
displace this individualistic concept of the people affirmed by the Court, whether 
rightly or wrongly, in Chisholm. Unlike the Ninth Amendment, which makes no 
sense whatsoever without presupposing the existence of the very unenumerated 
rights to which it refers, the Eleventh Amendment makes perfect sense whether or 
not you assume the existence of state sovereignty.  It can fairly be read as carving 
out of federal jurisdiction suits brought by two types of parties, an alteration in the 
jurisdiction afforded by Article III that required a change in the Constitution to 
accomplish.  At a minimum, the existence of Chisholm and the fact that its 
individualist concept of sovereignty were not repudiated by the Eleventh 
Amendment elevates this concept to among the contenders for how popular 
sovereignty was conceived at the time of the founding.  
 But putting aside the Eleventh Amendment, the really interesting 
challenge posed by Chisholm v. Georgia is its individualist theory of popular 
sovereignty.  What does it mean to say that the people are “joint-sovereigns”?  
This brings me to a final reason why Chisholm is not among the canon of 
constitutional law cases of which all learned lawyers must be aware.  Chisholm is 
ignored for the very same reason that the Ninth Amendment is ignored: it is 
simply too radical.  Indeed, the individualist popular sovereignty affirmed in 
Chisholm is the opposite side of the very same coin as the “other” individual 
rights retained by the people affirmed by the Ninth Amendment.70 The fact that 
Chisholm was gutted by the very same Reconstruction Court that gutted the 
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Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments because they too were too radical lends 
further support to the idea that the concept of sovereignty affirmed in Chisholm 
and the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment, along with the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
are ignored by the Court because the implications of taking them seriously are so 
momentous.  And law professors tend to internalize the Supreme Court’s 
boundaries on respectable legal argument. 
 If nothing else, Chisholm teaches that the concept of sovereignty as 
residing in the body of the people, as individuals, was alive at the time of the 
founding and well enough to be adopted by two Justices of the Supreme Court, 
who were also influential framers, and that the bold assertion that states inherited 
the power of kings (subject only to express constitutional constraints) was 
rejected by four of five Justices. By omitting Chisholm v. Georgia, the first great 
constitutional case, from the canon of constitutional law, we have turned our gaze 
away from perhaps the most fundamental question of constitutional theory and the 
radical way it was answered by the Supreme Court. We have hidden all this from 
our students; and by hiding it from our students, we have hidden it from 
ourselves. 
